The Russian Paradox
Russia's Dumpster Fire of a war in Ukraine explained ... the better Russia does on the battlefield the worse off it will be.
I’m Michael A. Cohen, and this is Truth and Consequences: A no-holds-barred look at the absurdities, hypocrisies, and surreality of American politics. If you received this email - or you are a free subscriber - and you’d like to subscribe: you can sign up below.
A Disaster Wrapped in A Catastrophe On Top Of A Tire Fire Inside An Enigma
There’s been a great deal of commentary on this site and elsewhere about the vast array of strategic errors made by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. But oddly, we may not be fully appreciating how bad it truly is — and how every day it gets worse.
Russia’s initial theory of the war appears to have been a strategy of launching a lightning strike into Ukraine and quickly capturing the country’s major cities, including Kyiv. The Ukrainian forces would put up little resistance, and Russia would quickly decapitate the Ukrainian leadership, and hand things over to a puppet regime. Western sanctions would be challenging, but since Russia weathered them in 2014, after the seizure of Crimea, they could do the same now.
Aside from misjudging their Ukrainian rivals, the capabilities of their own armed forces, and the Western response to an unprovoked invasion, “yes, the play was excellent, thanks for asking.”
Suffice to say, things are not working out as planned. But as a Plan B, Putin is adopting a bizarrely self-defeating strategy in which any possible tactical Russian success on the battlefield only serves to compound the folly of his initial decision to invade.
One Step Forward … A Lot of Steps Backward
Russia has two significant problems with the war in Ukraine. Aside from the abundant tactical failures of their military forces, even if they “win” militarily, they will need to find some way to pacify and occupy Ukraine while also coping with increasingly catastrophic economic sanctions.
Paradoxically, the only way for Russia to succeed on the battlefield (or so it appears) is to adopt precisely the scorched earth military tactics that will a) makes occupation that much more difficult and b) strengthen the resolve of Western governments to keep sanctions in place.
Let’s say that after weeks of indiscriminate bombing and civilian attacks on the port city of Mariupol, Russian troops finally captured the city. Then what? Russia can’t just leave it a smoking ruin. They will need to provide essential services for the local citizens, set up a military administration to allow for occupation, and begin rebuilding all the infrastructure they have destroyed. All the while, they will be likely be dealing with an angry and embittered civilian population intent on exacting revenge. This intractable process will have to be replicated in every Ukrainian city that the Russians capture.
To date, Russian battlefield fatalities are estimated between 6,000 and 8,000 troops. If one uses the metric of wounded being about 3 times the number of killed, the Russians are looking at somewhere between 26,000 to 32,000 losses out of an initial force of approximately 190,000. That’s a considerable number in a very short period, and keep in mind the fight to capture Kyiv will likely see these numbers significantly increase.
So, where will Russia find the troops for occupying Ukraine after they conquer it (if they do)? Keep in mind Ukraine is a country of 44 million people, nearly all of whom will view the Russians with anger and contempt. And as we saw during the US invasion of Iraq, combat troops are often ill-equipped to conduct an effective occupation of an enemy population (and many Iraqis viewed the Americans positively, at least initially). Moreover, where will Russia find a puppet regime to take over in Kyiv?
Pacifying and occupying Ukraine was always the most difficult element of the Russian decision to invade. That challenge has only intensified. Russia’s aggressive battlefield tactics have arguably made a near-impossible dilemma that much harder.
Now one could argue that once Russia captures Kyiv, they could choose to withdraw their troops, having taught the Ukrainians a lesson. But what benefit would that bring for Russia? The whole point of the war was to neuter and potentially decapitate the pro-Western Ukrainian leadership. If Russia departs after meeting its military goals, it will find itself, potentially, in a worse political position — with an openly hostile, pro-Western government on its Eastern border showered with Western military and economic assistance. The only way that Russia can genuinely declare victory is if it has a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and the only way that can happen is if they occupy the country, which they lack the resources to do.
Then there’s the issue of Western sanctions. Again, the better Russia does on the battlefield, the more Ukrainians will be killed, and the more Western social media feeds will be flooded with images of Russian war crimes against innocent civilians. That scenario will only strengthen the resolve of Western governments to keep sanctions in place — and even consider an additional set of punitive steps. And suppose Russia crosses a true red line, like killing Ukrainian President Voldemyyr Zelensky. In that case, it’s hard to imagine sanctions ever getting lifted as long as Putin remains in power (that may already be the case).
This may be the greatest challenge for Russia: military success makes the sanctions worse. The only way to potentially relieve the pressure from them is to walk away from the fight in Ukraine.
So, to sum up, any significant military achievement by Russian forces will bring an even worse overall outcome for Russia, both on the ground in Ukraine and back on the homefront. I’m hard-pressed to think of a single analogous historical precedent for the bind in which Russia has put itself.
But here’s where things really get ugly: it’s not as if an opposite approach will work for Putin.
Let’s say that Putin cries “uncle” and ends the war in Ukraine, even going so far as withdrawing troops. Then the war is a humiliating defeat, in which Russia is bloodied by a vastly inferior military force helped with NATO assistance. It’s difficult to see how Putin survives such an outcome and remains Russia’s leader. From a domestic political perspective, the best course of action — withdrawal — would likely be the worst personal outcome for Putin.
So, in other words, tails he loses, and also heads he loses.
At this point, the only real way out for Putin is some face-saving deal that would involve Ukrainian territorial concessions and a declaration of neutrality in return for the full withdrawal of Russian troops. Even that would be a half-victory because it would allow Zelensky to remain in power and Kyiv’s pro-Western tilt to continue. But it’s better than the alternative. And truth be told, it’s not necessarily clear that Kyiv would accept such a deal. Territorial concessions would be politically toxic for Zelensky, and he might conclude that it’s better to continue fighting — and hoping Russia breaks — than accepting a painful compromise.
Still, it’s a helluva thing that Putin has even put himself in this position. He’s reduced to choosing his least humiliating and damaging political outcome with no good options for salvaging the war. As I wrote the other day, Russia will lose the war. It’s only a question of how many more people will die before Putin realizes it.
Courtesy of the Simpsons, here’s a good summary of Putin’s current Ukraine strategy.
What’s Going On
The Senate voted by unanimous consent to make daylight savings permanent, and I’ve never been prouder to be an American.
Dana Milbank wonders how Ron DeSantis sleeps at night. I wonder the same thing.
Ohio is the latest state to allow its citizens to carry a concealed weapon in public without a permit or any training. Ohioans will needlessly die as a result of this political payoff to pro-gun voters.
Correction
Yesterday I wrote about South Dakota Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg, who in September 2020 killed a pedestrian with his truck and then fled the scene of the accident. I wrote that he sent a text message to a friend joking that “at least the guy” he killed “was a Democrat.” That was incorrect. Ravnsborg received the text message.
Musical Interlude
I caught a bit of this show in the car this morning, and I figured it’d been a while since I posted a Dead show. This one is a doozy - May 28, 1977 in Hartford, Connecticut. It’s also available as a commercial release, titled “To Terrapin.” Pretty much any 1977 Dead show is a good one and any May 1977 show is in the pantheon so you really can’t go wrong here.
I think this is one of the most intelligent pieces yet written about this stage of the war. What is stunning is that, while it took the United States years to get into a similar standoff in Vietnam, it only took Putin days.
As a strategist, and tactician, President Putin falls into the will mismanage a nocturnal emission category.